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Truth, Politics, Morality, by Cheryl Misak. New York and London: Routledge, 2000, 182 pp.
Cheryl Misak's Peircean Pragmatism
The pragmatist tries to make sense of the idea that our concepts, standards of inquiry, and our
conceptions of ourselves and the world are conditioned by the fact that we are cultural and social animals
in the natural world. But she does so without giving up a robust conception of objectivity and without
dumping everything into a sea of post-modern incommensurable standpoints and irreconcilable
differences of value.1
Misak's Fallibilist Cognitivism
In Truth, Politics, Morality, Cheryl Misak claims that her cognitivist version of pragmatism provides the
better philosophical reply to National Socialist apologist, Carl Schmitt.2 Her pragmatism provides a more
adequate reply to Schmitt, Misak argues, than the replies which are available either to fellow-pragmatist
Richard Rorty or to transcendentalist Karl-Otto Apel.
Like another Peircean, Susan Haack,3 Misak works at rescuing pragmatism from Rorty, by providing an
"entirely general pragmatist epistemology,"4 as opposed to Rorty's postmodernist status-quo-mired
"council of despair,"5 which avoids talk of truth altogether.6 But, while recommending cognitivism,
Misak will not go so far as to say that she knows of transcendental factors which comprise moral
discourse. Among the reasons for rejecting a transcendental account is that moral discourse remains open
to challenges, both at the first-order and at the metaethical level.
Misak's Critique of Rorty
Rorty's neo-pragmatism abandons the project of moral justification outside of the banding together
of those whose moral sensibilities happen to overlap. Rorty locates moral authority in the
contingency of present communal agreement, with no theoretical strings attached.
Misak provides an alternative pragmatic point of view when she analyzes moral inquiry in terms
of thick ongoing discourse. She argues that moral discourse is already fairly well-developed, clearly
truth apt, phenomenologically rich, and comparable in its aims and methods to the aims and
methods of the inquiries that we find in science and in mathematics. In a series of dense
discussions in the middle chapter of her book, she stumps for the philosophical relevance of
everything from Tarski's T-schema to superassertability and holism. This part of the book
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sometimes reads more like dissertation material than more mature work, but is indicative of her
commitment to bringing analytical theories to bear on her account.
As for splitting the difference between Rorty and Apel, on the side of critique, Misak is
particularly troubled that Rorty's view falls easily into line with Schmittean views which limit the
domain of moral discourse to existing communal preferences, and thus interpret morality as
simply given over to factors like will and power. On a view like Misak's, some preferences, e.g.,
fascist preferences, simply aren't allowed to have continued moral weight once we understand their
lack of openness to experience and logic. "Experience" here can be glossed as the experience of
outsiders like Jews in Nazi Germany. And "logic" here can be glossed as reliable truth conducive
relations between premises and conclusions in moral reasoning...in all kinds of reasoning (as we
learn from the middle part of her book.)
Once he is clearly understood, the Nazi is not to be taken as further contributing to our moral
discourse. He is excluded from sitting at the table as a full participant when moral issues are
discussed, though we can learn about him. We may explain his mistaken views on social-
psychological grounds. He and his have been served poorly, perhaps, by the government under
which they lived.
Unlike Schmitt, Rorty escapes from being found unsuitable to continue as a partner in
conversation. Rorty is a fellow pragmatic inquirer. The metaethical inadequacies of his view,
however, severely marginalize its usefulness in comparative moral discourse. Apel would also
continue to be seated at the table-of-moral-inquirers as a serious fellow-inquirer, albeit one whose
metaethics would alienate the pragmatist from her fallibilist project.
The argument against Rorty that I find most interesting is an important and powerful one. Rorty's
emphasis on contingency all-the-way-down allows for a disturbing sociological/psychological
lowest-common-denominator account to be shared by both him and Schmitt. Rorty and Schmitt
argue for the relevance of only the beliefs/preferences of existing communities, and Schmitteans
would plausibly predict the domination of "strong" communities over literature-based
communities with an ironic sense of their own contingency when it comes to acting decisively,7 and
maybe when it comes to acting at all.8 Schmitt, Misak tells us, chillingly posits "'the real possibility
of physical killing...the existential negation of the enemy'" as an option for the "strong"
community when it conflicts with "weak" communities: "All that disappears is a weak people."9
Misak is keen to show that there are options available to the non-Rortyean pragmatist that don't
so easily fall into metaethical line with uncritically sociological/descriptive rivals like Schmitt's. If
she, as a pragmatist, could not argue against Schmitt more effectively than can Rorty, if she could
not expand the pragmatist's account of grounded moral community beyond Rorty's invisible-hand
literary account,10 pragmatism would cease to be an attractive philosophical option for those who
look for practically effective and well-pursued philosophical arguments against fascism.
Pragmatism would cease to be an attractive option for anyone interested in pursuing a philosophy
of morals that takes our present substantial moral discourse at face value. Or that takes philosophy
seriously.
In her defense of a more substantial pragmatism, Misak opts for an internalist version of moral
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cognitivism, unpacking existing moral discourse as being both substantively rich in its content and
formally "truth apt," particularly when it deals with thick moral concepts like brutality. It helps
here to think of the discourse we find in the minutes of the South African Truth and Reconciliation
Commission, reports of the use of rape as a weapon of war in Bosnia, or in the transcript of
judicial hearings concerning serious and well-supported charges of child abuse. When we engage
in serious first order moral discussions like these, there is little doubt that we take ourselves to be
arguing for the truth of our moral conclusions. Unlike some of her peers, Misak is reluctant to be
revisionary about strong ordinary convictions concerning truth-aptness.
Thick discourses of the type mentioned above reveal practical urgency, sensitivity to the experience
of others, and a commitment to working through difficult problems in a manner that satisfactorily
reflects both a commitment to correcting moral wrongs as well as a recognition of the likely
wrongness of status quo norms. So, Misak is not reluctant to question ordinary convictions
regarding the legitimacy of comfortable status quo practices while nonetheless hewing to ordinary
convictions about truth.
Misak emphasizes the truth-aptness and reframing capacities of existing moral discourse. She
views both its first-order content and her second-order account of it as primary allies against
Rorty, and, as we will see, against Apel as well.
Misak's Contextualizing Move Against Apel
Like Apel, and unlike Rorty, Misak does not shy away from metaethics. Misak recommends
second order rules of thumb for interpreting moral inquiry throughout her book. Misak's rules
indicate a focus on openness (a Rortyean virtue) as well as formal adequacy (a virtue of Apel's).
Some pragmatic rules of thumb that indicate the openness of Misak's view are that: (1) Judges
inevitably and properly bring their perspectives to issues raised. And though we each bring our
own perspective to any case or controversy, we can systematically work to eliminate bias, by
including the experiences of others and by using data and evidence. Another way to question our
biases is to recognize that claims of injustice sometimes seem initially unintuitive, particularly in a
pluralistic world. (2) So, we have to recognize that in certain circumstances, particularly when we
ourselves are being accused of injustice, there will be a tendency to find little truth in the initial
accusation.11 (3) These realizations are the beginning of inquiry, and not its end.
Like Apel, Misak recommends formal metaethical constraints on morality. Some examples of
formal regulative constraints on moral inquiry are: (1) In seeking to account for morality by
tracing the curve of moral discourse towards a cognitively ideal (true) end, and by insisting that
agents take their beliefs to be bivalent (true or false but not both or neither), Misak is more like
Habermas and Apel than like Rorty and Schmitt. (2) In distinguishing between perspective and
bias, Misak distances herself further from Rorty, by embracing perspective while insisting that the
avoidance of bias is both possible and desirable. She can make sense of the idea of moral progress
without collapsing everything into first order agreement.
And there are commonalities among all three. By sifting through the phenomenology of moral
discourse, and detailing with whom we agree and why, Misak locates the truth of moral discourse
in real life action-guiding contexts, like both Rorty and Apel. Combining the gripping, sometimes
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wrenching, phenomenology of moral discourse with the cognitive commitments of those engaged in
it, Misak takes morals seriously without reifying existing moral practices, perhaps falling between
Rorty and Apel.
Misak's metaethics is thinner than Apel's because, for her, agents simply aim at ethical beliefs
which do not disappoint them in life. Agents do not typically aim at being rational in the full sense
implied by communicative-action theory.12 And Misak does not construe morality as being truth
apt for purely formal or "necessary" reasons. We discover the truth aptness of such inquiry by
engaging it, by saying what we practice and by practicing what we say. It is a truism that moral
discourse has taken the shape that it has through our contingent history of first-order moral
inquiry. It is not a truism that the shape it now takes is one indicating our preference for having
true beliefs which do not disappoint us, rather than aiming at abstract rationality in the moral
domain, contrary to Apel's arguments (and contrary to decision-theoretic views generally). That
moral discourse aims at true beliefs can be seen by the way agents offer reasons for and against
their favored conclusions.
Apel's argument is that when we engage with others in practical reasoning we "logically" commit
ourselves to a discourse with constitutive rules. Apel moves from his understanding of everyday
moral discourse through to a series of strong claims about the rationally necessary conditions of
that discourse. Misak does not object to substantial metaethics, but she questions how much we
can infer about the necessary conditions of all moral discourse, since moral discourse remains open
to recalcitrant experience, to deeply different views about what is true or good. Its history is
probably an unpredictable and herky-jerky one.
On Apel's view, as construed by Misak, once we engage others in moral discourse, we are also
performatively committed to the others' equality as participants in mutual dialogue. Any social
norms reached in practical discourse are valid "only if all who might be affected by it reach (or
could reach), as participants in a practical discourse, agreement that is valid."13 If one excludes
others, that person is reduced to silence, much as persons who fail to follow the fundamental rules
of any language game fail to engage.
So Apel's argument against Schmitt isolates Schmitt from all those who engage in moral inquiry
by condemning him to silence, much as Wittgenstein once tried to silence the Cartesian speaker of
private language. To take Schmitt's route, to "negate" (kill) people who are opposed to the strong
community, is inconsistent with the status conferred on those persons by the reciprocity of
communication. The national socialist "negation" of others is inconsistent with the rational
commitments embedded in the activity of engaging in moral discourse.
Misak thinks that her view is likely to be more persuasive to contemporary thinkers than Apel's
because it avoids the assumption of fixed and necessary conditions with regard to all moral
communication. She thinks that her version of contingency, where communities of inquiry who are
engaged in serious moral discourse aim at finding truth in thick contexts, is more plausible than
Apel's transcendental exclusion of outliers like Schmitt. This is partly because of Misak's
skepticism about moral discourse being closed within a priori theory.
Schmitt and Apel share an interesting aversion to the openness of moral discourse. Schmitt can sit
at the table and speak to us but we needn't take him seriously once he makes it clear that he shifts
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grounds from sociological/descriptive claims to philosophical/normative claims, taking refuge in
whichever set of claims insulates his view from critical improvement. The common ground shared
by Schmitt and Apel is, ironically, anti-pragmatic dogmatism, or being closed to recalcitrant
experience.
Misak's own characterization of truth in discourse is conditional and extra-epistemological, but
nonetheless keeps us focused on improving what we now think, by using standards internal to our
thinking. She says that truth in all forms of discourse is the result of an inquiry which could not be
improved upon (whether or not we are ever in position to know that we've "arrived").
Misak Between Rorty and Apel?
Unlike Rorty, and like Apel, Misak wants to be able to mount a strong intellectual line of attack
on Schmitt. One reason Misak is concerned to find a strong line of attack, is that National
Socialism was recommended as the appropriate moral/political status quo by the advocates of the
Third Reich, and is still a viable moral proposal according to present day National Socialists.
National socialism is thus a framing theme in some communities' thick version of moral-political
discourse.
Unlike Apel, and like Rorty, Misak does not believe that we have access to necessary conditions on
discourse that would rule the National Socialist out of bounds on transcendental grounds, that
would so isolate him that he would suffer a "social death" by being unable to communicate with
socially significant others. Unlike Apel, Misak relies on the norms expressed and shared in actual
moral discourse to point to ideal goals at which that discourse aims, without committing herself to
telling everyone ahead of time the conditions under which they must necessarily conduct their
moral inquiries.14
But this does not prevent her from ruling certain points of view to be out-of-bounds, once their
content is made clear. She believes that her account is sufficiently substantial to rule Schmittean
premises out-of-bounds without having to go transcendental herself in order to accomplish this
goal.
Once understood, Schmitt cannot be taken seriously as an equal or full participant in moral
discourse. This is not because he has violated the necessary conditions for participating in the
moral language-game. It is because, having listened to him, we find that his views are closed to the
justice claims of maginalized groups, and he goes well beyond failing to take the experience of
others seriously. He actually recommends brutality towards groups of people as a policy. Schmitt's
views have no moral standing because they attract adherents to exclusion and brutality rather than
the opposite. And he is not open to discovering that his views are false, just that they didn't win
out this time. If the aim of well-pursued moral discourse is moral progress, Schmitt's views
recognizably aim the opposite way, and also obscure the idea of progress itself. Misak says:
Given the tremendous similarity in human response to suffering, to kindness, to
affection, there seems no obstacle in principle to having the experience of an outsider be
relevant to a group.15
Where there is srong dissimilarity, where we are taking the experience of the mentally disabled, for
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instance, we must represent their interests as best we can, and include their well-being in our
policies.
And in terms of general moral pursuit, moral inquiry is aimed at truth or it is not. If it is, then
Schmitt has not adduced the kind of reasons that will allow us to learn from him, to make the
world a better place. If he does not accept the claim that moral inquiry is aimed at truth, then he'll
have to forgo giving reasons for his views as though he is arguing for their truth. If he then is
openly and self-consciously inconsistent, if he argues after cutting the ground out from underneath
offering justification for his preferred conclusions, he betrays an absence of the sort of sensibility
which allows us to make progress on issues like the inclusion of marginalized persons.
In the end, in the case of the most obstreperous fascist, one with blinders on, maybe we can only
give ourselves these kinds of reasons, within our sensibilities, for rejecting Schmitt.16 If he
understands, his fascist supporters are not likely to. But inability to persuade fanatics is not
equivalent to taking their view to be a worthy explanatory rival. And the decision to talk or not to
talk with someone who holds a dogmatic and racist point of view will depend on contextual factors
that don't allow ruling out either option ex ante.
Does Misak Succeed in Her Arguments?
Misak's account depends on the truth aptness of moral discourse, and the distinction between first
order inquiry and our second-order theories about that inquiry. It depends on the relative
importance of getting our metaethical view roughly right in terms of issues like assertability,
cognitivism, and fallibility. It also depends on our acceptance of her account of objectivity, and the
acceptance of the end of inquiry as the production of inquiry which cannot be improved upon.
A Rortyan friend of mine reacts to Misak by saying that "She doesn't really pull it off," preferring
to replace her "metaphysical" talk of moral truth with talk of justification in terms of wide
reflective equilibrium. And Rorty himself could argue that Misak's cognitivism and her distinction
between first and second order theory are all well and good within the present-day language
community of philosophers. But both critics would emphasize the question "Is our world a better
place because of Misak's Peircean theory?"
For most philosophers, being a "better place" might well include being an intellectually clearer
place, a more reasonable place, a better explained or understood place. This is so even if "truth"
and "morals" are both contested concepts. Providing a general account of truth or even of moral
truth is a complex task, one where disagreement will not be fully settled by any philosophical
argument. This appears to be just the sort of area where a new and carefully-worked-out account
could flourish. My Rortyan friend, who may have already given away too much to high theory by
appealing to wide reflective equilibrium, is already engaged in Misak's form of pragmatism. Wide
reflective equilibrium has, as a core component, the idea that we must be careful about what
conclusions follow from which premises. Logic, with its clearly spelled out account of truth,
validity and soundness is our best second-order account of that. And here, an understanding of
theory does inform use. From an aesthetic point of view, Misak's account also does a better job of
providing a theoretically unified pragmatic account than views which deliberately eschew most
philosophical distinctions, and hers is thus the "better" view virtually by default within the
community of philosophical inquirers. In closing I'll offer an analogy: I'm not sure if Misak will
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do for new-millennium pragmatism what Rawls did for anti-utilitarian social philosophy, but
original philosophical accounts are never powerful or useful for non-ironic purposes unless they
are theoretically informed, unless they respect the hard-won results gained by the community of
philosophical inquirers by digging deep for resources within the field.
H. Eugene Cline
Albion College
Notes
1. Cheryl Misak, Truth, Politics, Morality, (Routledge, 2000), p. 4.
2. Colleagues in political science tell me that there's a lot more to Schmitt than being a foil for
views like Misak's. And Misak says that "Schmitt's own concern with argument and justification
led to his eventual falling out with the Nazis." (Misak, 147)
3. See Haack's, Evidence and Inquiry, (Blackwell, 1993) where Peirce's notion of asymptotically
approaching truth is replaced by an analogy to filling in an elaborate crossword puzzle. Misak
replaces Peirce's criterion with the idea of an inquiry "upon which we could not improve."
4. Misak, p. 102.
5. Misak, p. 17.
6. Misak lumps Rawls with Rorty on the issue of truth-avoidance, a mistake which goes beyond
the scope of this review.
7. Charles McCracken has argued that important philosophers in our canon (Plato, Aristotle,
Descartes, Leibniz, Locke, Kant, Hume) are intellectually important because of the subtle,
ingenious, and highly theoretical content of their arguments. Such is not the practical stuff of the
domination of others. Schmitt, on this account, is the apotheosis of the philosopher.
8. And this is part of the delicious irony of Rorty's argument for a return to the leftist activism of
the early twentieth century in books like Achieving Our Country. His thin theory won't provide the
motivation that drives people to act for social good in risky circumstances.
9. Misak, p.11.
10. On Rorty's view, if we read the right books, we would move towards solidarity, much as Adam
Smith's invisible hand moves individuals acting in self interest towards general good. Though it
can't hurt to be familiar with humane letters, other frameworks (e.g., Amartya Sen's), and other
theories of literature (e.g., Martha Nussbaum's), provide better guides to social policy.
11. Misak, p. 135.
12. And it's not clear what Misak would make of the unmasking function found in preference
maximizing or evolutionary accounts (that imply an underlying, often hidden, "rationality") of the
sort discussed in Elizabeth Anderson's “Beyond Homo Economicus: New Developments in
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Theories of Social Norms”, (Philosophy and Public Affairs, 29, number 2). These theories could fit
into Misak's metatheory, so long as we can use them to better understand what we're doing in
practical terms.
13. Misak, 43.
14. Except to insist on both truth aptness and avoidance of inconsistency.
15. Misak, 148.
16. Misak, 147.
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